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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
HENRY PARKMAN and HOWARD WHITESIDE 
§ll.l. Standing to raise issues of constitutionality. Five lawyers, 
in the case of Kaplan v. Bowker,1 brought a petition for mandamus 
against the members of the special commission established by the 
legislature to investigate Communism and subversive activities. The 
petitioners alleged that they brought their action as citizens, tax-
payers, and lawyers interested in the execution of the laws and in the 
enforcement of the Constitution. They claimed that the resolve,2 in 
calling upon the commission to list all persons concerning whom 
"creditable" evidence had been received that such persons were or are 
members of the Communist Party, Communists or subversives, violated 
the Constitution in several respects, and they sought to have the com-
mission ordered not to make such a report. 
The petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners had 
no standing to sue. They expressly disclaimed any expected investi-
gation of themselves or any expected injury to themselves, but sought 
to assert a public right. The Supreme Judicial Court emphasized 
the rule that only persons who have suffered an injury, or who are in 
danger of doing so, can put in issue the validity of an act of the legis-
lature, and cited many cases to that effect. 
HENRY PARKMAN and HOWARD WHITESIDE are partners in the firm of Parkman, 
Robbins and Russell, Boston. 
Mr. Parkman is a former Corporation Counsel for the City of Boston and was 
formerly Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany. 
Mr. Whiteside was formerly counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union and is 
presently a member of the Civil Liberties Committee of the Boston Bar Association. 
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Joseph M. McDonnell, of the 
Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY, in the preparation of this chapter. 
§11.1. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 69, 131 N.E.2d 372. 
2 Resolves of 1954, c. 123. 
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Petitioners sought to bring themselves within an exception to the 
rule as exemplified in such cases as Brewster v. Sherman3 and Sears v. 
Treasurer and Receiver General,4 where a public officer owes a duty 
to the public to perform some act or administer some law for public 
benefit, any member of the public may enforce such duty by man-
damus. The Court found no such duty imposed on the respondent 
commission, but only a duty to investigate and report to the General 
Court. 
It must be confessed that it is sometimes hard to draw the line be-
tween the rule and the exception as stated by the Court. The decision 
does make it clear that an official's duty to uphold the Constitution is 
not sufficient to bring into playa citizen's right to seek mandamus. 
§11.2. Freedom of expression. Two cases and two statutes during 
the 1956 SURVEY year involved the provisions for freedom of speech 
and press in the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. 
Commonwealth v. Jacobs! concerned a Quincy city ordinance, re-
quiring a license to be obtained before holding a public meeting or 
giving a public speech. Defendant operated a sound truck under 
hire by a labor union to urge listeners not to buy the products of a 
concern involved in a strike. A Superior Court conviction of violation 
of the ordinance was reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court, through 
Chief Justice Qua, said in part: 
We are of opinion that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its 
face. It is a complete and indiscriminate prohibition of all public 
address on all public streets or grounds without a previous per-
mit. ; .. All public address without previous censorship is 
placed under the ban regardless of its character, attributes, or con-
sequences.2 
At the end of the opinion, a wry paragraph suggested that, if not 
bound by federal precedents based on the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Massachusetts Court might consider sound trucks so likely to become 
public nuisances that a complete prohibition of them in public places 
might be upheld. 
Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc.3 involved pro-
posed publication of a book concerning plaintiff's alleged cancer cure. 
Claiming that irreparable harm was threatened by allegedly false, 
fraudulent, and malicious statements in the book, plaintiff sought to 
prevent its publication. 
The Superior Court denied an injunction and plaintiff appealed. 
The higher Court stated that liberty of the press is constitutionally 
basic and that permitting prior restraint, provided only that the judge 
3195 Mass. 222, 80 N.E.2d 821 (1943). 
~ 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621 (1951). 
§11.2. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 983, 129 N.E.2d 620. 
2 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 984, 129 N.E.2d at 621. 
s 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 134 N.E.2d 1. 
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believes the proposed publication to be false, amounts to unconsti. 
tutional censorship.4 
The Court reviewed cases in which it was proved that defendant 
was actuated solely by malice in making continued attacks on a plain. 
tiff and in which an injunction was granted. It stated that while 
equity jurisdiction extends to libel and slander cases, the area must be 
greatly limited because of the constitutional protection of free speech 
and the public interest in the discussion of many issues. 
In the Krebiozen case, the Court found an important public interest 
to be served in the discussion of cures for cancer, and further found 
that there was here no question of protecting the lewd, obscene, pro-
fane, or the merely libelous. Both the right of free press and the 
public interest led to the affirmance of the lower court's denial of an 
injunction. 
In the 1955 ANNUAL SURVEY,4a the cases of Brattle Films, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Public Safety5 and Times Film Corp. v. Commissioner of 
Public Safety6 were discussed. These cases struck down as unconsti-
tutional the Sunday censorship statute.7 In 1956 the legislature has 
attempted to save the licensing statute by permitting to films, as to 
jukeboxes, annual licenses, and leaving other forms of public enter-
tainment subject to prior licensing for each occasion.8 
A careful reading of the Brattle Films case certainly does not lead 
to the conclusion that the prior licensing provisions of the act can be 
validly applied to any form of public entertainment entitled to First 
Amendment protection. 
The 1956 legislature also passed an act 9 further regulating the dis-
tribution and sale of publications depicting crime and torture. These 
new sections, a complete revision of this subject, seem aimed, at least 
in part, at what are known as "horror comic books" being sold to 
young children. 
The former Section 30 concerned distribution to minors of "a book, 
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the 
publication or principally made up of criminal news, police reports 
or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures and stories of lust or 
crime .... " The new section is concerned with distribution to a 
child under eighteen years of "any pamphlet, magazine, comic book, 
4 }<'or a good discussion of prior censorship, and whether enjoining, after a full ad-
versary hearing, further distribution of an admittedly obscene book constitutes un-
constitutional prior censorship (the Court held that it does not), see Brown v. Kings-
ley Books, 1 N.Y.2d 177, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956), now on appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
4a 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1. 
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 127 N.E.2d 891. 
61955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 813, 127 N.E.2d 893. 
7 G.L., c. 136, §4. 
8 Acts of 1956, c. 157. 
9 Acts of 1956, c. 724, amending G.L., c. 272 by striking out §30 and adding a new 
§30 and §30A. The old §30 was cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting 
opinion in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 522, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 673, 92 L. Ed. 
840,853 (1948), as being invalidated by the decision. 
3
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picture, picture book, ballad or other printed or written material 
which contains in its text, title, illustration or accompanying advertise-
ments, a fictional description or illustration of sadism, masochism, 
sexual perversion, bestiality or lust, or of the physical torture of human 
beings." 
Also in the new act knowledge by the defendant of the offensive 
description or picture contained in the literature is not necessary. 
The statute states also that 
It shall be prima facie evidence of offering such literature for sale 
to a child under eighteen if-
(a) It is displayed upon a newsstand, counter or shelf in a store 
frequented by children under eighteen or adjacent to a primary 
school or public playground; and 
(b) If the words of the text or dialogue, exclusive of proper 
names, are written in the vocabulary of the seventh grade or below. 
There is a new Section 30A aimed at tie-in sales which makes the 
distributor jointly responsible with the retail dealer who violates 
the section unless the retailer purchased by written order specifying the 
publication by title. 
In the report of the special commission which recommended this 
legislation it is said that this legislation is designed primarily to meet 
the objections posed by the United States Supreme Court in the 
Winters case.1° The commission went on to say that the members dis-
approve of censorship per se, but "do think that there must be a legal, 
constitutional manner in which to afford protection against pure 
license as purveyed by certain publishers." 11 
Two constitutional questions arise in regard to this bill. The first 
is whether the terms sadism, masochism, etc. are sufficiently definite 
so that an "honest distributor of publications could know when he 
might be held to have ignored such a prohibition." 12 This require-
ment has to be met, of course, whether the prohibition of sale of the 
publication is limited to minors or not. 
Another dubious phrase is that restricting the effect of the statute 
to a text written in the vocabulary of the seventh grade. 
As to the second question the fact of limited prohibition may be 
important. The question is whether the sale of these publications 
can be constitutionally prohibited. It would seem that they could 
not if the prohibition related to all persons.1S The fact that the 
restriction is intended to be limited to distribution to minors (under 
eighteen) would seem to eliminate the constitutional objection as long 
10 House No. 3205, p. 24 (1956). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519, 520, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 672, 92 L.Ed. 840, 
852 (1948). 
13 A fictional description of physical torture of human beings would surely seem to 
be constitutionally protected. 
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as the prohibition does not unreasonably restrict adult access to the 
publications.14 
§11.3. Federal pre-emption: Control of sedition. The question of 
whether state action was permitted, or whether federal legislation had 
occupied a certain area to the exclusion of state law, arose in a num-
ber of decisions.1 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert 2 and Commonwealth v. Hood S were 
prosecutions involving the so-called Anti-Anarchy Act of 1919,4 as 
amended, and the so-called Anti-Communist Act of 1951.5 The de-
fendant in the former case was indicted for conspiring to advocate the 
violent overthrow of the governments of the United States and of 
Massachusetts. Hood was prosecuted for belonging to and contribut-
ing to the Communist Party, knowing it to be a subversive organization 
as defined in the 1951 act. Both cases were reported without decision 
to the Supreme Judicial Court, on motions to quash the indictments, 
under a 1954 statute, which for the first time in criminal cases permitted 
before trial such a report of important questions of law.6 
Inasmuch as a Pennsylvania case7 was then pending before the 
United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Court postponed 
decision until on April 2, 1956, the Pennsylvania case was decided,S 
holding that the Smith Act,9 the Internal Security Act of 1950,lQ and 
the Communist Control Act of 1954 11 indicated an intent on the 
part of Congress to occupy exclusively the field of sedition at least where 
the offense charged is a federal crime. The United States Supreme 
Court specifically did not pass on that part of the Pennsylvania stat-
ute covering overthrow of the state government. 
The Massachusetts Court dealt first with the argument that a com-
mon law charge of sedition, as well as a conspiracy to violate the Anti-
Anarchy Act, had been asserted. It declined to pass on the suggestion, 
since, in its view, federal pre-emption applied both to common law 
and statute. As to the charge of conspiracy to overthrow the state 
government, it was held that the indictment and particulars disclosed 
the "familiar paraphernalia of Communist agitation for the overthrow 
of government in general [which] cannot be directed separately and 
exclusively against the government of this Commonwealth." 12 
14 On the problem see Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1955); Butler v. Michigan, 352 
U.S. -,77 Sup. Ct. 524.1 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1957). 
§11.3. 1 In addition to cases discussed herein, see §14.3 infra. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 134 N.E.2d 13. 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 501, 134 N.E.2d 12. 
4 C.L., c. 264, §11. 
I) C.L., c. 264, §§19, 23. 
6 C.L., c. 278, §30A, discussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.8. 
7 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954). 
S 350 U.S. 497,76 Sup. Ct. 477. 100 L. Ed. 640 (1956). 
918 U.S.C. §2385 (1952). 
1050 U .S.C. §§781 et seq. (1952). 
1150 U.S.C. §841 (1952). 
\21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 498, 134 N.E.2d 13, 16. 
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While holding that the nature of the accusations made brought the 
case within the scope of Commonwealth v. Nelson, the opinion was not 
without reservation. 
"We do not wish to be understood as saying that there can never 
be any instance of any kind of sedition directed so exclusively against 
the State as to fall outside the sweep of Commonwealth v. Nelson." 13 
The Court had even less trouble in finding that the charges in 
Commonwealth v. Hood fell within the area exclusively pre-empted 
by United States statutes. 
It appears that in no case, in the present state of law, can the 1951 
statute be upheld, while the 1919 statute, as to sedition exclusively 
against the state, retains effectiveness in a very limited area. 
§llA. Due process and equal protection. Contentions of denial 
of due process and equal protection of the laws were made in a variety 
of cases. Two of these, Commonwealth v. Chapin1 and Common-
wealth v. Makarewicz,2 were first degree murder convictions. The 
latter case is examined in the chapter on criminal law.3 Two other 
cases, however, deserve treatment here. 
In Commonwealth v. Antonio,4 a husband and wife, graduates of a 
school of chiropractic, were convicted of practicing medicine without 
being registered. Since, in Commonwealth v. Zimmerman,5 a chiro-
practor had been convicted under a similar, predecessor act to the 
present medical registration statute, the defendants had the heavy 
burden of persuading the Court to overrule that case, in which the 
assertions of constitutional violation had been rejected. 
It was argued that because pharmacists, Christian Science practi-
tioners, and others were exempted from the medical registration stat-
ute, equal protection of the laws was denied in withholding from 
chiropractors a similar exemption. Evidence had been introduced to 
show that chiropractic is permitted in forty-four states and is far more 
firmly established than it was forty years ago when the Zimmerman 
case was decided. Hence it was argued that altered circumstances had 
made void a once valid statute. 
In affirming the conviction, the Court said that the arguments made 
were more appropriately to be addressed to the legislature, and that 
they did not affect the constitutionality of the statute. 
Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. City of Gloucester6 came 
up on defendant's appeal from a final decree on a bill for declaratory 
decree. Plaintiffs were two corporations occupying space on the State 
Fish Pier at Gloucester. Pursuant to statute,7 the Commonwealth 
13 Ibid. 
§11.4. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245,132 N.E.2d 404. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 203, 132 N.E.2d 294. 
<I See §§12.1 and 22.2 infra. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951, 129 N.E.2d 914. 
5221 Mass. 184,108 N.E. 893 (1915). 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 811, 135 N.E.2d 20. 
7 Acts of 1931, c. 311; Acts of 1936, c. 303; Acts of 1937, c. 29; Acts of 1954, c. 252. 
6
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built the Fish Pier, and leased it to a nonprofit organization to admin-
ister in the public interest. The Gloucester Community Pier Asso-
ciation, Inc., the nonprofit corporation, sublet facilities on the pier to 
various enterprises. Open space was sublet to plaintiffs, which erected 
buildings and tanks. 
Purporting to act under G.L., c. 59, §3A, which provides for taxa-
tion to the lessee of real estate owned by the Commonwealth or a 
city or town, and used for other than public purposes, the Gloucester 
assessors levied taxes on plaintiffs' buildings and tanks, but not on the 
land underlying them, and on none of the other land or buildings on 
the pier. 
The plaintiffs asserted a number of objections, two of which were 
upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court. First, it was said that under 
G.L., c. 59, §3 a building cannot be taxed apart from the land it 
occupies. 
Secon<;l, plaintiffs' claims of denial of equal protection of the laws, 
and that the taxes were not proportional and reasonable as required 
by Part II, c. I, §l, Art. IV of the Massachusetts Constitution were up-
held. The fact that only two out of a much larger number of occu-
pants were assessed for taxes was said by the Court to be arbitrary, 
unjust, and discriminatory. 
It is plain from the decision that all of the tenants were subject to 
tax, and it is not entirely clear why the Gloucester assessors sought 
to tax only the plaintiffs. 
§11.5. Validity of the Fair Trade Laws. General Electric Co. v. 
Kimball Jewelers) Inc.! was a decision on a bill in equity brought to 
enjoin defendant from selling plaintiff's trade-marked appliances at 
prices lower than minimum prices stipulated in fair trade contracts 
between plaintiff and numerous retail dealers. The suit was brought 
under the Massachusetts fair trade law.2 
Defendant has no contract with plaintiff. It attacks the validity of 
plaintiff's contracts with other dealers, and claims that the state and 
federal fair trade acts are void. 
The suit was reported from the Superior Court without decision. 
The Supreme Judicial Court after extended discussion held the con-
tracts under attack to be valid and that plaintiff was not to be denied 
relief because of asserted inequitable conduct. 
On the constitutional issue, the Court cited several Federal Circuit 
Court cases to the effect that no federal constitutional difficulty exists 
in enforcing state fair trade laws, and that the McGuire Act 3 has 
validly extended immunity from the antitrust laws to permit action 
under state laws against dealers who have not signed contracts. The 
great majority of state cases, collected in a footnote to the Court's 
opinion,4 have held state fair trade laws valid and not violative of 
§1l.5. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 132 N.E.2d 652. 
2 C.L., c. 93, §§I4A-I4D. 
315 U.S.C. §45(a) (1952). 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 315, 132 N.E.2d 652, 658. 
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federal or state constitutions as a denial of due process or an unlawful 
delegation of power. 
The Court granted an injunction restraining defendant from un-
derselling plaintiff's minimum prices as set in its fair trade agreements. 
The fair trade laws have been a prolific breeder of litigation, and 
while Massachusetts has now joined the majority of states in upholding 
the application of the law to non-signers, substantial constitutional 
and public policy arguments are to be found in cases reaching the 
contrary result. The temptation of a retailer to undersell his com-
petitor, when he has not agreed to refrain from doing so, is so strong 
that the fair trade act, constitutional or not, presents wide-scale prob-
lems of enforcement. 
§11.6. More on urban redevelopment: Area-wide taking and dis-
crimination. McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Boston Housing Authorityl 
put in issue provisions of the land redevelopment statute2 already 
passed on and held valid in Papadinis v. City of Some,rville3 and Dis-
patchers' Cafe, Inc. v. Somerville Housing Authority.4 The precise 
point of the McAuliffe case was not passed on in the previous cases, 
although it was latent in the facts as presented. 
The plaintiff, McAuliffe & Burke Company, sought a declaratory 
decree to prevent its land and buildings from being taken as part of 
a substandard and decadent area to be redeveloped. The principal 
complaint of plaintiff was that seven parcels within the area were ex· 
cluded from the taking, and that the Housing Authority was em-
powered only to take all or none of the land in a designated area. 
Therefore, said the plaintiff, this discrimination as to certain parcels 
invalidated the taking. 
The plaintiff further contended that ample provision was not made 
for those displaced, as the statute required. 
The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court without de-
cision. Both the plaintiff's contentions were rejected, and a decree 
was ordered upholding the taking. 
On the plaintiff's second point, it was held that the facts showed 
a proper plan for persons displaced. 
On the issue of the validity of taking less than all of the area, the 
Court held that plaintiff had standing to object, but that there was 
no violation of the governing statute, and also that the omission of 
certain parcels did not invalidate the taking of the balance. "Struc-
tures suitable to and consistent with the new use to which the area 
is to be put need not be destroyed merely because they happen to be 
located within a substandard and decadent area." 5 
§1l.7. Automobile insurance: The "Merit Rating System." Men-
tion should be made of certain Opinions of Justices which dealt with 
a number of constitutional issues. ' 
§11.6. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 447, 133 N.E.2d 493; see also §1.4 supra. 
2 C.L., c. 121, §§26JJ-26MM. 
3331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954). 
4332 Mass. 259, 124 N.E.2d 528 (1955). 
111956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 447, 450, 133 N.E.2d 493,496. 
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In one,1 the Court advised that a law requiring a refund to motor 
vehicle owners of insurance surcharges under the so-called "point 
system," after the repeal of that portion of the act doing away with 
future surcharges, would be an attempt to create new substantial rights 
based wholly on past events, and would be an attempt to take the 
property of the insurance companies which had received the sur-
charges, and bestow it upon private persons without compensation 
for a purpose not public. It would therefore be in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Articles 
X and XII of the Declaration of Rights of the Commonwealth. 
The facts were that while some persons who had been surcharged 
had paid higher insurance rates, others had therefore paid rates which 
were lower, and a return of surcharges to the persons penalized would 
adversely affect the insurance companies and give undue benefits to the 
persons insured. 
§11.8. Public nonprofit corporations: The Port Authority. In a 
long opinionl considering the proposed Massachusetts Port Authority 
Act, in which thirty-four questions posed by the state Senate were 
pass"ed upon, the Supreme Judicial Court decided that the proposed 
authority would not be a private corporation, but a nonprofit organiza-
tion for a public purpose. The appointment of its members by the 
Governor, its powers and duties in relation to public facilities, its non-
profit setup, all were important features of the authority which led 
to the Court's conclusion. 
With the nature of the authority determined, the answers to the 
many questions followed almost automatically as to whether the 
authority's charter would be subject to amendment and revocation. 
The Court replied that, subject to such constitutional prohibitions as 
that against taking property without compensation or without due 
process of law, no irrevocable contract was created any more than in 
the establishment of a municipal corporation. A further question was 
whether under Article LXVI of the Amendments to the Constitution 
this corporation could be created if it were not placed in one of the 
twenty executive and administrative departments prescribed by the 
Amendment. The Court replied that a corporation in its own right 
need not be placed in one of these departments. It was ruled, in 
response to further questions, that no unlawful delegation of power 
by the General Court was shown in the proposed statute. 
The whole opinion conforms to a trend that has in recent years 
marked the approval of independent governmental bodies created to 
supervise housing, redevelopment of decadent land areas, and special 
problem areas such as that of the port of Boston, with which this 
opinion concerned itself. 
§11.9. Public nonprofit corporations: Tax benefits. In another 
advisory opinionl the Justices answered questions involving the validity 
§11.7. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 134 N.E.2d 923. 
§11.8. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 136 N.E.2d 223. 
§11.9. 1 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 135 N.E.2d 665. 
9
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of a proposed bill 2 exempting real and personal property of urban re-
development corporations from ordinary property taxes and imposing 
upon them excise taxes payable to the Commonwealth and distribut-
able to the municipalities in which the property is located. The Court 
held that, since urban redevelopment corporations perform functions 
for the public benefit, property owned by them and used in such serv-
ice may be favored over the ordinary business corporation in the 
matter of taxation.a In so holding, the Justices distinguished this 
situation from that dealt with in a 1955 Opinion of the Justices.4 
There it was held that the dominant purpose of the plan under 
question was resale to private interests to which interests some of the 
tax advantages were to be extended. Here the tax advantages are con-
tinued only so long, not exceeding forty years, as the project con-
tinues to operate under public regulation and for the public benefit. 
The Court also said that the redevelopment of a "blighted open 
area" 5 is a public purpose for which urban redevelopment corpora-
tions may be formed. In Papadinis v. City of Somerville6 the Court 
had reserved judgment on this issue. In this opinion the judges ex-
pressed themselves because "the questions here presented may involve 
a 'blighted open area.' " 7 
§ll.lO. Right to trial by jury: Defective delinquent commitment 
procedure. Various aspects of the new procedure under C.L., c. 123, 
§1l3 for commitment of so-called defective delinquents have been 
dealt with by the Supreme Judicial Court in the recent past 1 and 
were discussed in the 1954 ANNUAL SURVEy.2 In Commonwealth v. 
Bigwood,S decided in the 1956 SURVEY year, the defendant raised the 
issue of his right to trial by jury afforded by Article XV of the Declara-
tion of Rights. 4 The defendant, who had been found guilty in the 
juvenile court of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, was not sentenced but, after general continuance of his case, 
was committed to the Department of Defective Delinquents for ob-
servation and, subsequently, after return to the court of the required 
sworn medical certificate, was ordered committed to that department 
2 House No. 2879 (1956). This bill was substituted for by Senate No. 3205 which 
was passed and signed by the Covernor as Acts of 1956, c. 640, amending C.L., c. 
121A, §IO. 
a See Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X, and id., Part II, c. I, §I, Art. IV 
in relation to proportional taxes. 
4332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955). The opinion is discussed in the 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §11.7. 
5 As defined in C.L., c. 121A, §I, appearing in Acts of 1953, c. 647, §l. 
6331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954). This case and the problem are discussed 
in the 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2 and the 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.7. 
71956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 908, 135 N.E.2d 665, 667. 
§II.IO. 1 Dubois, Petitioner, 331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E.2d 920 (1954); Tardiff, Peti-
tioner, 328 Mass. 265, 103 N.E.2d 265 (1952); O'Leary, Petitioner, 325 Mass. 179, 89 
N.E.2d 769 (1950). 
2 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.l0. 
s 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 469, 133 N.E.2d 585 . 
• Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XV. 
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as a suitable subject. No further action was taken in connection with 
the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.5 The order 
of commitment was appealed to the Superior Court and after a hear-
ing without jury the Superior Court ordered the defendant committed 
as a defective delinquent. 
Upon report by the then chief justice of the Superior Court6 the 
defendant claimed that he had been deprived of his statutory and 
constitutional right to trial by jury. 
In view of the fact that the defendant made no request for framing 
of jury issues and that it appeared he had waived his right to a jury 
in writing on the question of his commitment, the Supreme Judicial 
Court found that he had not been deprived of his statutory right to 
trial by jury or his constitutional right, if such a right existed. The 
Court was careful to point out that it did not intimate that the provi-
sions of the Constitution applied to an issue of mental deficiency. The 
report itself was dismissed on the ground that there had been no 
"conviction" of the defendant as required for a report by G.L., c. 278 
§30. 
The Court's remarks in connection with its citing of the Dubois case7 
indicate that the Court considers it to be doubtful that a constitutional 
right to trial by jury in commitment proceedings brought under the 
defective delinquent statute exists. In Dubois the Court, referring to 
another statute8 similar and supplementary to G.L., c. 123, §113, said: 
"In no sense is it a criminal or penal statute. It does not purport to 
define a crime and it imposes no penalty. Commitment under its pro-
visions is not in the nature of a punishment." 9 Earlier, in Bashaw v. 
Willett,IO the Court held in connection with guardianship proceedings 
that Article XV of the Declaration of Rights did not entitle one 
alleged to be an insane person to a jury trial on the issue of his sanity. 
Both in Dubois, Petitionerp and Commonwealth v. Bigwood 12 the 
noncriminal nature of the proceedings for commitment under G.L., c. 
123, §1l3 is emphasized.13 It would appear that, as defective delin-
5 General Laws, c. 123, §1l3 provides for the filing of an application for commit-
ment as a defective delinquent by :r district attorney at, "any time prior to the final 
disposition of [any criminal] case" other than a capital case and further provides, 
"If a person has been committed as a defective delinquent in accordance with this 
section, such commitment shall be a final disposition of any criminal offence 
charged." 
6 The case went to the Supreme Judicial Court upon report under G.L., c. 278, 
§30. The Court was of the opinion that the case was not properly there by report 
since §30 applied only to cases in which the defendant was "convicted" but went on 
to discuss the case on the merits nevertheless since the practical result under the 
holding of the Court would be the same. 
7331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E.2d 920 (1954). 
S Acts of 1953, c. 645. 
9331 Mass. at 578, 120 N.E.2d at 922. 
10327 Mass. 369, 99 N.E.2d 42 (1951). 
11331 Mass. 575, 578,120 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1954). 
121956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 469, 471, 133 N.E.2d 585, 587. 
13 "The provision that his commitment as a defective delinquent 'shall be final 
disposition of any criminal offense charged' does not mean that his commitment is 
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quent commitment proceedings are considered to be noncriminal in 
nature and as the Court had already recognized in Bashaw v. Willett 
that no right to jury trial existed in another class of civil proceedings 
involving an issue of mental deficiency, the Court will hold, should 
the issue be directly raised in the future, that no constitutional right 
(as distinguished from a statutory right) exists under the statute con-
sidered in the Bigwood case. 
§ll.ll. The police power. General Laws, c. 138, §25C provides 
a comprehensive scheme for the fixing by the Alcoholic Beverage Com-
mission of minimum prices for the sale at retail of intoxicating liquors 
in package stores. In Supreme Malt Products Co. v. Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Commission1 the plaintiff in a bill in equity to enjoin the 
enforcement of a six-day suspension of its package store license and 
petitioners for writs of certiorari to quash similar penalties contended 
that the statutory scheme did not bear a real and substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare2 and was there-
fore an unlawful exercise of the police power under both the federal 
and state constitutions. There were also subsidiary contentions that 
Section 25C was discriminatory and that the power in the Commission 
to fix prices had been unlawfully delegated. 
The Court upheld the statute, relying mainly on the ground that the 
liquor traffic is sui generis in respect to its potential danger to the 
community.3 The alleged fact that the legislation prohibiting price 
cutting had been sponsored by an organization said to represent twelve 
hundred package stores was held not to render the statute null and 
void if it was otherwise valid. 
So far as the other contentions of the plaintiff and the two peti-
tioners were concerned, that is, that the statute was discriminatory and 
that there had been an unlawful delegation of legislative power to 
the Commission, the Court held: (1) that there was no discrimination 
since the legislation applied uniformly to a "separate and distinct 
branch uf the liquor business," and (2) that there had been no unlaw-
ful delegation since the statute set out the general policy and was de-
a sentence for an offence. Rather it means that the complaint for the offence is 
dismissed. It would be strange indeed if commitment for an indefinite term for 
any form of mental deficiency should be a punishment for crime." 1956 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 471, 133 N.E.2d at 587. 
§11.11. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483, 133 N.E.2d 775. 
2 See Sperry and Hutchins v. Director of the Division on the Necessities of Life. 
307 Mass. 408, 418,30 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1941). 
3 "The power of the State to protect itself by an exercise of the police power is 
commensurate with the nature of the evil which it seeks to eliminate. If the Legis-
lature came to the conclusion that the establishment of retail prices for customers of 
package stores would tend to promote temperance, to stabilize the package store 
business, to avoid price wars and cut throat competition, and to instill more observ-
ance for the law in those engaged in the business and would better protect the 
public, we cannot say its belief was so irrational that none of these objects would 
result from the passage of the act." 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483, 485. 133 N.E.2d 775. 
778. 
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tailed sufficiently to guide the Commission in maintaining existing 
prices. 
The emphasis of the Court on the "danger" and "evil" 4 either 
potentially or presently existing in the liquor traffic could conceivably 
give rise to the thought that the Court might hesitate to sustain mini-
mum price regulation in a business with less noxious overtones. Yet 
the Supreme Malt Products Co. case and the other state cases5 sus-
taining the fixing of minimum prices for sales of liquor fall in the 
same class with Nebbia v. New York,6 in which the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the fixing of minimum prices for sale of milk 
to consumers. The Court said in that case: 
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the 
absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt 
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to protect 
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adopted 
to its puopose. . .. If the laws passed are seen to have a reason-
able relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are 
satisfied .... 7 
§1l.12. Due process: vested rights. The plaintiffs in Boston Real 
Estate Board v. Department at Public Utilities1 contended that an 
order of the Department prohibiting, except with the Department's 
approval, after a specified period and with certain exceptions, Edison 
Electric Company's practice of supplying at wholesale rates electricity 
for resale deprived the plaintiffs of constitutionally vested rights in 
the practice and the benefits therefrom and, therefore, amounted to a 
taking of property without due process of law. 
During Edison's development it had, for the purpose of securing 
off-peak customers without a corresponding increase in generating 
capacity, supplied electricity at wholesale rates to owners of real estate 
for resale to their tenants, and to so-called "block plants" whose chief 
business was, as in the case with Quaker Building Company, the plain-
tiff in the second of the two bills in equity, to resell electricity to 
buildings and occupants thereof in particular city blocks. The effect 
during this period was to induce self-generators of electricity to stop 
that business and instead buy electricity from Edison. As circum-
stances changed, the practice became disadvantageous to Edison from 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 485, 133 N.E.2d at 777-778. 
5 Gipson v. Morley, 217 Ark. 560, 233 S.W.2d 79 (1950); Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 
Conn. 176, 99 A.2d 89 (1953); Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.W.2d 149 (1942); 
Gaine v. Burnett 122 N.J.L. 39,4 A.2d 37 (1939). 
6291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934). 
7291 U.S. at 537, 54 Sup. Ct. at 516, 78 L. Ed. at 957. 
§11.12. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 987, 136 N.E.2d 243. This case was actually two 
bills in equity against the Department of Public Utilities under the review procedure 
set forth in G.L., c. 25, §5. The plaintiffs in the first case were owners, managers, 
and operators of rental real estate in Boston. The business of the record plaintiff, 
Quaker Building Co., is described in the text. 
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a revenue point of view and the Department, in its findings in the 
instant case, ruled that the practice was against the public interest 
inasmuch as Edison was deprived thereby of revenue which it must 
obtain by additions to bills to its other customers. 
Recognizing that the practice had enabled the plaintiffs to conduct 
profitable businesses for many years and that the order affected the 
value of property used in the business as well as obligations under 
existing contracts, the Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless was of the 
opinion that the benefits enjoyed were merely collateral to a practice 
that had been for a time in the general public interest but was no 
longer so. Such opportunities for profit as the plaintiffs had did not 
carry with them any constitutional assurance of continuance. Citing 
Brand v. Board of Water Commissioners of the Town of Billerica2 
and Weld v. Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners3 the Court 
emphasized that such rights to service by a utility as exist, exist only 
insofar as they are claimed through the public and are in the public 
interest. No such incidental private advantages as were enjoyed by 
the plaintiffs could be said to be vested in them. 
That being so there has not been, as the plaintiffs contend, a tak-
ing, but merely a diminution or destruction of the value of property 
not taken which is permitted under the police power so long as the 
action taken is reasonable and non-arbitrary. 
With respect to the "reasonableness" of the order, the Court points 
out that the detriment to other Edison customers and to the general 
interest resulting from the availability of a profit-yielding rate struc-
ture to Edison's competitors is sufficient to support the conclusion that 
the order is reasonable. 
Specific exceptions to the order were objected to by the various 
plaintiffs on the grounds that the exceptions discriminated against and 
denied equal protection of the laws to them. These exceptions are 
classified by the Court: (1) as provisions with the lawful purpose of 
ameliorating the effect of the police power change, and (2) as not dis-
criminatory since such classes of customers as may be treated differ-
ently than the plaintiffs are reasonably classified. 
The main constitutional ground of the Court's decision, that is, the 
absence of vested rights in continuance of the practice, is in line with 
decisions of other courts cited in the opinion.4 
§11.13. Eminent domain: Public parking lots. Whether or not 
land already used by private owners for a public parking lot may be 
taken by eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a city-owned 
parking lot was the question answered in the affirmative in Tate v. 
2242 Mass. 223, 136 N.E. 389 (1922). 
3 197 Mass. 556, 84 N.E. 101 (1908). 
4 Campo Corp. v. Feinberg, 279 App. Div. 302, 306, 1I0 N.Y.S.2d 250, 255 (1952), 
aff'd without opinion, 303 N.Y. 995, 106 N.E.2d 70 (1952); Sixty-Seven South Munn, 
Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, 106 N.J.L. 45, 147 Atl. 
735, afJ'd, 107 N.J.L. 386, 152 Atl. 920 (1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 828, cited in 
1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 987, 998-999, 136 N.E.2d 243,251. 
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City of Malden.1 A decree holding the taking null and void was re-
versed and a decree ordered to be entered adjudicating the validity of 
the taking. The taking was made under a special statute2 by which 
the city of Malden was authorized to take land and buildings at certain 
specified locations and also on "any other streets in said city as the city 
council may determine." To the contention of the plaintiffs that this 
was an unlawful delegation as to any location in the city other than 
those specified, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute was 
sufficient authorization to take land or buildings on any street in the 
city. 
With respect to the contention that there was no necessity for the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain since the land was already 
devoted to public use as a parking lot, the Court answered logically 
that there was no certainty that the land could not at any moment 
be sold for other purposes or devoted to other uses. This is distin-
guishable from the situation in Cary Library v. Bliss,3 in which the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that there was an improper exercise of 
the power of eminent domain in taking land already permanently 
held "for a public use" under a trust, for another similar public use. 
Here the Court is sound in pointing out that there was no such per-
manent commitment. 
Finally the Court, citing cases from other jurisdictions,4 holds that 
provision of off-street parking places is a public purpose for which 
land may be taken under the eminent domain power. The parking lot 
has the status of a "public utility." 
§11.13. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 136 N.E.2d 188. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 600. 
3 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 92 (1890). 
4 Poole v. City of KanKaKee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416 (1950); Phillips v. Officials 
of City of Valparaiso, 233 Ind. 414, 120 N.E.2d 398 (1954); City of Trenton v. Lenz-
ner, 16 N.J. 465, 109 A.2d 409 (1954); Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 
451,99 N.E.2d 235 (1951). 
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